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Abstract 
 
Existing studies show that firm asset and investment growth predict cross-sectional stock 
returns. Firms that shrink their assets or investments subsequently earn higher returns than 
firms that expand their assets or investments. I show that the superior returns of the low asset 
and investment growth portfolios are due to the omission of delisting returns in CRSP monthly 
stock return file and that the poor returns of the high asset and investment growth portfolios 
are largely driven by the subsample of firms that have issued large amounts of debt or equity in 
the previous year. Controlling for the effects of the delisting bias and external financing, I do 
not find an independent effect of asset or investment growth on stock returns. 
 
 
 
JEL Classifications: G11, G12 
 
Keywords: Asset Growth; Investment Growth; Cross-Sectional Stock Returns; Return Anomaly; 
Delisting; Equity and Debt Issuances; External Financing 
 
 
 1 
1. Introduction 
 
Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) (hereafter CGS) present a significant asset growth effect in 
U.S. stock returns. On average, firms in the lowest asset growth decile earn risk-adjusted 
returns of 9.1% in the subsequent year, while firms in the highest asset growth decile earn -
10.4%, an annual return spread of 19.5%. The return spreads are significant across different size 
groups and even after value-weighting (although the magnitude reduces to 8.4% per year). In 
an earlier study, Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) (hereafter TWX) find that firms that substantially 
increase capital expenditure earn negative risk-adjusted returns subsequently. Stocks in the 
lowest investment growth quintile on average earn more than 1% per month in the following 
year than stocks in the highest investment growth quintile. Using different measures of 
investment growth, Anderson and Garcia-Feijoo (2006) confirm the negative relation between 
investment growth and subsequent stock returns. These two cross-sectional stock return 
patterns are often referred to as “asset growth anomaly” and “investment growth anomaly”, 
respectively.1 
The median firm in the lowest asset growth decile shrinks its total assets by more than 20% 
within a year and the median firm in the lowest investment growth decile cut its investments by 
80%. What have happened and will happen to these firms that substantially reduce their assets 
and investments? It is very likely that these firms have performed poorly in the past and are 
dying out in the near future. If the stock of a shrinking firm gets delisted from the NYSE, AMEX, 
or Nasdaq in the following year, over 90% of the chance its return in the delisting month is not 
                                                 
1 Strictly speaking, stock return anomalies refer to excess returns that cannot be explained by the stock’s 
associated risk. Relating risk to return requires the use of an accurate asset pricing model, which 
researchers are still exploring. More broadly, an anomaly is a stylized pattern in stock returns that cannot 
be explained by existing asset pricing models such as CAPM, or the Fama-French three-factor model. The 
use of the word “anomaly” in this paper is in reference to this broader definition.  
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reported in CRSP’s regular monthly stock return file. Data suggest that about a half of the stock 
delistings are due to poor firm performance. Since returns of delisting due to performance tend 
to be very negative, omitting them in the computation of portfolio returns introduces a 
significant bias into the tests. The true portfolio returns accounting for the probability of 
delisting are presumably lower. 
The median firm in the top asset growth decile increases its assets by 130% and the median 
firm in the top investment growth decile triples its capital expenditure within a year. What 
drives the substantial increases in assets and capital investments of these firms? It is hard to 
imagine the 130% increase in firm assets is a result of organic growth. More likely these firms 
fast expand their assets by issuing large amounts of debt or equity. Large external financing 
mechanically increases the issuer’s assets. The tripling of capital expenditure is also naturally 
fuelled by external financing proceeds. Vast evidence suggests that firms realize abnormally 
low returns following large equity and debt financing.2 It is thus interesting to know to what 
extent the asset and investment growth anomalies are related to the widely documented 
“external financing anomaly”.  
In this paper, I show that the asset and investment growth anomalies are largely explained 
by the delisting bias and the external financing anomaly. In particular, the superior returns of 
the negative asset or investment growth portfolios are due to the omission of delisting returns 
in CRSP monthly stock return data; the poor returns of the high asset or investment growth 
portfolios are driven by the subsample of firms that have issued large amounts of debt or equity 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Loughran and Ritter (1995), Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995), Ritter (2003), Daniel and Titman 
(2006), and Pontiff and Woodgate (2008) for evidence of underperformance following equity issuances; 
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999), Lee and Loughran (1998), Dichev and Piotroski (1999), Billett, Flannery, 
and Garfinkel (2006) for evidence of underperformance following debt issuances. Bradshaw, Richardson, 
and Sloan (2006) develop a comprehensive measure of net external financing and confirm a strong 
negative relation between net external financing and future stock returns. 
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in the previous year. Controlling for these two factors, I do not find an independent effect of 
asset growth or investment growth on stock returns.  
Shumway (1997) is the first to document the delisting bias in CRSP data. He finds severe 
omissions of delisting returns in CRSP data, especially for firms delisted for poor performance 
reasons. If this fact is ignored, portfolio returns constructed from CRSP data are upward biased. 
I examine 19,885 non-financial stocks that have appeared in the CRSP monthly stock return file 
(CRSP.msf) during the period from July 1968 to December 2009. Among them 4,004 are still 
listed by the end of 2009. Of the 15,881 delisted stocks, only 1,490 (9.38%) have the delisting-
month returns reported in the CRSP monthly stock return file. In other words, more than 90% of 
the delisted stocks do not have their delisting returns recorded in the file. How large are 
delisting returns? Shumway (1997) and Shumway and Warther (1999) collected a large 
proportion of missing delisting returns from other sources and show that the delisting return is 
on average -30%. It could reduce further to -55% if the sharp decrease in liquidity after delisting 
and the expected worse returns of those uncollectable delisted stocks are accounted for.  
I find that the probability of delisting in the following year due to poor performance is 
almost four times as high for firms in the lowest asset growth decile as it is for firms in other 
deciles (12.48% vs. 3.14%). Similarly, the probability of delisting for poor performance is 8.78% 
for stocks in the lowest investment growth decile versus 3.38% for other stocks. This evidence 
hints an important role of the delisting bias in generating the asset and investment growth 
anomalies. Indeed, after correcting the delisting bias, I do not find that stocks in the lowest 
growth decile (decile 1) earn higher returns than most other deciles (except for deciles 8-10 for 
the asset growth anomaly and decile 10 for the investment growth anomaly).  
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The poor returns of firms in the highest asset or investment growth deciles are limited to 
those that have issued large amounts of debt or equity in the previous year. High asset and 
investment growth are often accompanied by large equity and/or debt issuances. The 
Spearman rank correlation between asset growth and external financing is as high as 0.70 and 
the correlation between investment growth and external financing is 0.39. The correlations 
become stronger if we focus on firms with extremely high growth. For instance, I find that 87% 
of the firms in the highest asset growth decile (decile 10) have conducted at least a large equity 
or debt offering. This number is in sharp contrast to only 3%-5% of the firms in the first seven 
asset growth deciles that have sought external financing of similar magnitude. 
To control for the effect of external financing, I divide firms in the three highest growth 
deciles (deciles 8-10) into those that have issued a large amount of debt or equity and those that 
have not. I find that the poor returns are only found in the users of large external financing. 
Firms that have not used external financing of such a magnitude but have expanded assets or 
investments of a similar magnitude do not underperform firms in the first seven deciles. In 
other words, asset and investment growth do not have an independent effect on stock returns 
after controlling for the effect of external financing. This conclusion is also confirmed by 
regression evidence. 
A recent study by Fama and French (2008) also hints the importance of equity issuances in 
generating the asset growth anomaly. Unlike CGS, Fama and French construct asset growth on 
a per share basis, by which they effectively control for asset changes due to new equity issues, 
stock repurchases, and stock-swap acquisitions. They find that the asset growth anomaly (on a 
per share basis) is not robust in large stocks. However, even if based on their measure of asset 
growth, the anomaly still exists in microcap and small stocks (market cap below the NYSE 
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median), in both equal- and value-weighted returns. Their measure does not account for asset 
growth due to debt issuances, which, as shown in this study, are also important in generating 
the anomaly. Fama and French do not examine the investment growth anomaly.  
The findings of asset and investment growth anomalies have generated much research 
interest. Most studies have attempted to explain the phenomena from economic or behavioral 
points of view. For instance, Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) show that the investment growth 
anomaly is stronger in firms whose managers have greater investment discretion and in time 
periods when hostile takeovers were less prevalent. They conclude that investors underreact to 
the empire building implications of investment expansion. Anderson and Garcia-Feijoo (2006) 
find strong correlations between investment growth and the book-to-market equity ratio and 
suggest that the negative relation between investment growth and subsequent returns is 
consistent with the rational models of Berk, Green, and Naik (1999), and Carlson, Fisher, and 
Giammarino (2004, 2006). Fast growing firms accelerate investment, which transfers more risky 
growth options into less risky assets in place and therefore reduces expected returns. Cooper, 
Gulen, and Schill (2008) argue that the asset growth anomaly is most consistent with investor 
over extrapolation of past gains to growth. Chan, Karceski, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2008) 
find that the asset growth anomaly is more pronounced in firms with low levels of past 
profitability and poor corporate governance, and imply that the anomaly is due to investors’ 
under-reaction to managers’ empire-building investments. Lipson, Mortal, and Schill (2010) find 
that the asset growth anomaly is more evident in stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility and 
suggest that costly arbitrage is the driving force behind it. Similarly, Lam and Wei (2010) 
suggest that limits to arbitrage and investors' under-reaction to managers’ overinvestment 
jointly explain the asset growth anomaly. Li and Zhang (2010) also imply that the limits-to-
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arbitrage hypothesis seems to excel q-theory with investment frictions in a horse race to explain 
these two anomalies. On the other hand, Chen and Zhang (2009) show that the asset growth 
anomaly can largely be explained by the factor of market risk premium and two new factors 
they propose — an investment factor and a return-on-asset factor. They argue that these factors 
are motivated by rational economic models, and therefore the anomaly could be explained by 
risk-based theories. 
I take a different approach to examine these two anomalies. Instead of searching for 
economic or behavioral driving forces, I scrutinize whether the “anomalous” return patterns are 
new anomalies or a repackaging of some previously-known return patterns. My findings point 
to the latter. Future studies attempting to explain these two anomalies should not separate them 
from the return underperformance following large debt and equity issuances. Similarly, studies 
attempting to explain the external financing anomaly need to account for issuers’ substantial 
increases in capital investments. A few studies have already made efforts along this line of 
research, for instance, Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2006), Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang 
(2008), Li, Livdan, and Zhang (2009), among others. In addition, my findings in the paper 
highlight the importance of correcting the delisting bias in asset pricing tests based on CRSP 
monthly stock return file. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the asset 
and investment growth variables. In Section 3, the first part examines the impact of the delisting 
bias on the anomalies; the second part examines the effect of large external financing on the 
anomalies. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data and Variables 
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Following Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008), I examine all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ 
nonfinancial firms (excluding firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) included in the 
CRSP monthly stock return file and the CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged database’s fundamentals 
annual file. Firms are required to be included in the fundamentals annual file for at least two 
years. Stock returns on which I performed tests are between July 1968 and December 2009 (498 
months).3 Accounting variables that are used to explain returns from the July of calendar year t 
to the June of calendar year t+1 are constructed from fiscal years t-1 and t-2.  
At the end of June of each year t from 1968 to 2009, stocks are allocated into deciles based on 
the ranking of each individual firm’s asset or investment growth rate from fiscal year t-2 to t-1. 
Firms in decile 1 have the lowest growth rates and firms in decile 10 have the highest growth 
rates in each year. Portfolios are formed and held from July of year t to June of year t+1 and 
then rebalanced (based on the growth rates from fiscal year t-1 to t). Following CGS (2008), the 
asset growth rate (AG) is calculated using the year-to-year percentage change in total assets (A): 
ܣܩሺݐ െ 1ሻ ൌ ஺ሺ௧ିଵሻ஺ሺ௧ିଶሻ െ 1 .        (1)  
Following TWX (2004), the investment growth rate (IG) is computed as follows: 
ܫܩሺݐ െ 1ሻ ൌ ሺܥܣܲܺ/݈ܵܽ݁ݏሻ௧ିଵሺሺܥܣܲܺ/݈ܵܽ݁ݏሻ௧ିଶ ൅ ሺܥܣܲܺ/݈ܵܽ݁ݏሻ௧ିଷ ൅ ሺܥܣܲܺ/݈ܵܽ݁ݏሻ௧ିସሻ/3 െ 1,          ሺ2ሻ 
where CAPX/Sales is a firm’s capital expenditure scaled by its sales of the contemporaneous 
year. Alternatively, I also construct IG as used in Anderson and Garcia-Feijoo (2006) as their 
primary variable of investment growth:  
ܫܩሺݐ െ 1ሻ ൌ ܥܣܲܺ௧ିଵܥܣܲܺ௧ିଷ െ 1.                                                                           ሺ3ሻ 
                                                 
3 The monthly returns studied are from July 1968 to June 2003 in Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008), from 
July 1973 to June 1996 in Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004), from July 1976 to June 1999 in Anderson and 
Garcia-Feijoo (2006). 
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In most of the following tables, Panel A contains results about the asset growth anomaly 
and Panel B presents results about the investment growth anomaly. Although I used both 
measures of investment growth in the tests, for the sake of brevity, only the results based on the 
measure in Eq.(2) are reported. All the results based on the Eq.(3) measure are qualitatively 
same and are available upon request.  
The first row in Panel A of Table 1 reports the time-series average of the cross-sectional 
median annual asset growth rate in each decile. The average annual asset growth rate is about -
21% for firms in decile 1 (the lowest AG) and is 130% for firms in decile 10 (the highest AG). The 
average growth rate of firms in decile 5 is 7%. More than 20% of firms reduce their assets.  
The first row in Panel B reports the time-series average of the cross-sectional median 
investment growth rate in each decile, where the investment growth rate is measured as in 
Eq.(2). The average investment growth rate is about -80% for firms in decile 1 (the lowest IG) 
and is 194% for firms in decile 10 (the highest IG). Over a half of the firms in fact experience 
negative investment growth.  
 
3. Portfolio Return Analysis  
After allocating firms into deciles based on their asset and investment growth rates at fiscal 
year t-1, I calculate the monthly returns for equal- and value-weighted portfolios from July of 
year t to June of year t+1. The value used for weighting is the stock’s previous month market 
capitalization. This procedure generates a time-series of returns for each portfolio from July 
1968 to December 2009 (498 months in total). Table 1 presents the time-series means of the 
monthly portfolio returns. Panel A reports the results of asset growth portfolios. The portfolio 
returns decrease almost monotonically from low asset growth deciles to high asset growth 
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deciles. The portfolio of firms in the lowest asset growth decile (decile 1) earns an equal-
weighted monthly return of 1.79% and the portfolio of firms in the highest asset growth decile 
(decile 10) earns 0.17% on average. A hedging portfolio long in stocks with the lowest asset 
growth and short in stocks with the highest asset growth earns a return of 1.62% (t-statistic = 
9.03) per month in the following year. If portfolio returns are value-weighted, firms in decile 1 
earn 1.26% and firms in decile 10 earn 0.27% on average per month, resulting in a spread of 
0.99% (t-statistic = 4.63). These results are very close to what CGS find in their shorter sample 
period.4 For the purpose of later comparison, I also report the return spreads between decile 1 
and decile 6. Firms in decile 6 have achieved some positive growth in assets but not large in 
magnitude. 
Next, I run time-series regressions of these portfolio returns on the Fama and French (1993) 
three factors. This is done to estimate the alphas – the average returns that are not explained by 
the Fama and French three factors. The implicit the null hypothesis is that the Fama and French 
three-factor model does an adequate job of explaining expected returns associated with firm 
asset growth. Therefore, a statistically significant alpha – the intercept from the time-series 
regression - suggests an “abnormal” return. The results are again similar to those demonstrated 
by CGS. Using equal-weighted portfolio returns, firms in the lowest asset growth decile have a 
monthly alpha of 0.59% (t-statistic = 2.65), while the highest growth firms have an alpha of –
0.82% (t-statistic = -5.68). The alpha for the hedging portfolio is 1.41% (t-statistic = 8.87). Using 
value-weighted portfolio returns, firms in the lowest asset growth decile have a monthly alpha 
of 0.15% (t-statistic = 1.15), and firms with the highest asset growth rates have an alpha of –
0.49% (t-statistic = -4.68). The alpha for the hedging portfolio is 0.64% (t-statistic = 3.64).  
                                                 
4 The slight differences in magnitudes between CGS and my results are due to difference in our sample 
periods. In fact, I have replicated their results in almost same magnitudes in their sample period.  
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Panel B of Table 1 presents the results for portfolios sorted on investment growth. The 
equal-weighted average return is 1.35% for decile 1 (the lowest IG) and 0.78% for decile 10 (the 
highest IG), resulting in a monthly spread of 0.57% (t-statistic =6.12). Fama and French three 
factors do not explain the difference in returns. The alpha for the hedging portfolio is 0.52% and 
statistically significant (t-statistic =5.75). The investment growth anomaly, however, is less 
significant if portfolio returns are value-weighted. The return spreads between decile 1 and 
decile 10 are still positive, but not statistically significant, so is the alpha from the time-series 
regression of the Fama-French three-factor model.  
Next in Section 3.1, I examine the probability of delisting for firms in each decile and its 
implication for portfolio returns if delisting returns are not included in the CRSP stock return 
files. In Section 3.2, I investigate how extremely high asset or investment growth is fuelled by 
large external financing and the implications for these two anomalies if large external financing 
is controlled for. 
 
3.1. The delisting bias and its implications for the anomalies 
Stock exchanges sometimes delist stocks before investors are able to sell them. Reasons for 
delisting include mergers and acquisitions, liquidations, moving to other exchanges, and poor 
performance (e.g. bankruptcy, insolvency, insufficient capital etc.). The CRSP monthly stock 
return file (in particular, CRSP.msf at WRDS) often does not include the delisting-month returns 
of the delisted stocks. Omitted delisting returns introduce a bias in empirical tests, as only the 
survivors’ returns are accounted for. The delisting bias in the CRSP data is first documented by 
Shumway (1997). He shows that CRSP data fail to include delisting returns for most stocks that 
have been delisted for poor performance reasons. For example, only 120 out of 1029 firms 
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(11.7%) delisted from NYSE and AMEX due to poor performance during the period between 
1962 and 1993 have their delisting return reported in CRSP's stock return files. For these 
reported cases, the average delisting return is -41.56%. The situation is even worse for Nasdaq- 
more firms have been delisted from Nasdaq due to poor performance, and none of their 
delisting returns is included in CRSP’s stock return files. In addition, he shows that delists for 
performance-related reasons are generally surprises and thus incur very negative returns. 
Motivated by Shumway’s work, the CRSP research department has expended efforts and 
resources to retrieve delisting returns. Over 90% of the delisting returns are successfully 
retrieved (see CRSP Delisting Returns, 2001). Are we waived of the delisting bias concern, if so? 
Not really, it still depends on how we use the CRSP data. CRSP has a monthly stock return file 
(CRSP.msf) that collects the monthly returns of stocks traded in the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq 
since January 1926. This file has become the most popular database for empirical tests on stock 
returns. But this file does not include delisting returns most of the time. The retrieved delisting 
returns are recorded in a separate file called monthly stock event file (CRSP.mse).5 In order to 
avoid the delisting bias, researchers need to combine delisting returns recorded in the monthly 
stock event file into the monthly stock return file.  
I use a simple test to illustrate that the regular monthly stock return file often omits delisting 
returns. Table 2 reports the results. I first identify all non-financial firms that have their stock 
returns once included in the CRSP monthly stock return file during the period between July 
1968 and December 2009. Of the 19,910 stocks in total, 4,404 (22%) are still listed and traded at 
one of the three markets by the end of December 2009. Of the remaining stocks, I am able to 
identify the month of their delisting for 15,881 stocks using CRSP’s monthly stock event file. I 
                                                 
5 I was informed by the CRSP staff that the separation of regular-month returns and delisting-month 
returns into two files could result from WRDS’s repackaging of the CRSP data.  
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then check if the regular monthly stock return file reports a non-missing return in the month of 
delisting for these delisted stocks. Only 1,490 out of the 15,881 stocks (9.38%) have a return 
reported for the delisting month, while the remaining 14,391 stocks (90.62%) fail to do so. 
Among them almost a half are delisted for performance-related reasons. Moreover, even for the 
1,490 delisted stocks with a return reported for the delisting month, the reported return may not 
account for the delisting effect.  
Omitted delisting returns introduce a bias into studies that only use CRSP’s monthly stock 
return file, especially when the variable of interest is correlated with the probability of delisting. 
For instance, Shumway and Warther (1999) show that the widely-documented size effect was 
found to be absent from NASDAQ stocks after correcting the delisting bias. Firms often reduce 
in size before being delisted for poor performance. The size effect is found in the data because, 
when the returns of size portfolios are computed, we do not account for the omitted delisting 
returns of some small firms. The delisting bias could also lead to the discovery of the asset and 
investment growth anomalies. Distressed firms cut investments, and for various reasons, their 
assets reduce before delisting. If firms in the negative growth portfolios tend to be delisted more 
often than firms in the high growth portfolios, the superior returns found in the low growth 
portfolios in the following year could be the result of delisting returns being omitted in the test. 
I examine the potential of such a delisting bias on the asset and investment growth 
anomalies. Table 3 presents the results. I first compute the percentage of stocks that are delisted 
in the subsequent year (from July of year t to June of year t+1) for each asset growth decile, and 
find that the probability of delisting is 17.75% for stocks in the lowest asset growth decile, and 
9.22% for stocks in the highest asset growth decile. The difference is statistically significant at 
the 1% level using a two proportion z-test. Shumway (1997) suggests that the delisting bias is 
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more pronounced for stocks delisted for performance-related reasons. I follow his work to 
estimate the probability of delisting due to poor performance. Reasons for delisting (i.e., the 
delisting code) are obtained from CRSP’s stock event file. Stocks in the lowest asset growth 
decile have a 12.48% probability of being delisted in the following year due to poor 
performance, while the probability is only 4.55% for stocks in the highest asset growth decile. 
The difference is also significant at the 1% level. Stocks in the second lowest asset growth decile 
(decile 2) also have a high probability of delisting for performance-related reasons, i.e. 5.64%. In 
comparison, the probability for deciles 3 to 9 ranges only from 2.08% to 3.31%. This evidence 
sends a clear message: compared to stocks with moderate or high asset growth, stocks with very 
negative asset growth have a significantly higher probability of being delisted for poor 
performance in the following year. Intuitively, poorly-performing firms would cut investments 
and shrink assets through a fire sale or spinoff before their stocks are delisted. Omitting 
delisting returns therefore would impose a potentially significant bias on the returns for the 
portfolios of poorly performed stocks. 
Thanks to CRSP’s efforts, the remedy for correcting the delisting bias is readily available. As 
reported in Table 4, CRSP has retrieved delisting returns for almost 95% of the stocks delisted 
from NYSE or AMEX, and for almost 90% of the stocks delisted from Nasdaq. The delisting 
returns with the reasons for delisting are stored in the stock event file (again, not the monthly 
stock return file). As suggested in Shumway (1997), delistings triggered by performance-related 
reasons (delisting codes 500, 505 to 588) incur extremely negative returns. For example, about 
24% of the delistings from NYSE or AMEX are triggered by poor firm performance and these 
stocks have an average delisting return of -44.5%. The average delisting return for performance-
driven Nasdaq stocks is -21.0% but a higher proportion of the delisted stocks in Nasdaq (46%) 
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are triggered by poor performance. Moreover, the 5% of NYSE/AMEX stocks and 10% of 
Nasdaq stocks that do not have their delisting return retrieved are primarily triggered by 
performance-related reasons. Shumway and Warther (1999) argue that the delisting returns of 
those unidentified stocks are almost certainly worse and the fact that there remains no trace of 
those stocks suggests that many may have become worthless. 
I correct the delisting bias as follows. For the 90% of stocks in the monthly stock return file 
without delisting-month returns, I compound their last-reported return with the delisting 
return from the monthly stock event file. For the other 10% of stocks that have a return reported 
for the delisting month, I compare the reported return with the delisting return from the stock 
event file. If the delist is triggered by performance-related reasons, I choose the lower of these 
two returns as the true return. Note there are 5%-10% of delists that CRSP is unable to retrieve 
their delisting returns. I replace the missing delisting returns in the stock event file by the 
average of identified delisting returns in the same stock exchange for the same reason of 
delisting. For example, if an NYSE stock delisted for performance-related reasons does not have 
its delisting return reported, I assume its delisting return is -44.5%. Similarly if a Nasdaq stock 
is delisted for non-performance reasons, I replace its missing delisting return by 3.34%.  
Table 3 presents the portfolio returns after correcting the delisting bias. The correction 
results in lower returns for all asset growth portfolios, but its effect is the largest on the lowest 
decile. The average equal-weighted return of decile 1 drops from 1.79% per month before 
correction, to 1.50% after correction. This translates into a magnitude of 29 basis points per 
month. The average equal-weighted return of decile 10 also drops from 0.17% to 0.10%. As a 
result, the spread between decile 1 and 10 remains as high as 1.40% per month and is 
statistically significant (t-statistic = 8.01). The correction of the delisting bias has a smaller effect 
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on value-weighted returns. The reason is straightforward: in the month before delisting, most 
stocks have a small market capitalization. Therefore, their low returns in the following month 
contribute little to the value-weighted portfolio returns.  
I run time-series regressions on both the equal- and value-weighted portfolio returns. The 
alpha estimates suggest consistent results. Both the equal- and value-weighted portfolio alphas 
for the lowest asset growth portfolio (decile 1) are no longer statistically different from zero. The 
spreads in alphas between deciles 1 and 10 are still positive and statistically significant. 
However, they are clearly driven by the large and negative alphas of the highest asset growth 
portfolio, which is -0.91% for the equally-weighted portfolio and -0.52% for the value-weighted 
portfolio. Both are statistically significant at the 5% level. In fact, the alpha of decile 1 is not 
different from the alphas of deciles 2 to 7 for the equally-weighted portfolios, and of deciles 2 to 
9 for the value-weighted portfolios.  
In summary, the superior returns of the low asset growth portfolios are largely driven by 
the delisting bias in CRSP’s monthly stock return file. After correcting this bias, the lowest asset 
growth portfolio earns similar returns to other asset growth portfolios except for the three 
highest asset growth portfolios (deciles 8, 9, and 10). 
The delisting bias has a similar effect on the investment growth anomaly. As reported in 
Panel B of Table 3, the probability of delisting during the subsequent year for stocks in the 
lowest IG decile is 13.67%, significantly higher than the average probability of delisting for 
stocks in other deciles. If we pin down to the delisting due to poor performance, the probability 
is 8.78% for stocks in the lowest IG decile versus 2%- 4% for most of the other deciles. The 
message is again clear: stocks with extremely negative investment growth are more likely to be 
delisted for poor performance in the subsequent year. Correcting the delisting bias, I do not find 
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that stocks in the lowest IG decile outperform stocks in other deciles except for decile 10. In fact, 
the value-weighted returns of decile 1 tend to be lower than most of the other deciles. The 
return spreads between deciles 1 and 10 are still positive, and statistically significant for equal-
weighted returns. This is clearly driven by the significant underperformance of stocks in decile 
10.  
 
3.2. External financing and its implications for the anomalies 
It is interesting to learn what drives the significant growth in assets or investments for firms 
in deciles 8 to 10, and why these firms earn poor returns in the following year. A potential 
answer could be related to high levels of external financing. Large equity or debt offerings 
increase the issuers’ assets substantially. External financing is often motivated to raise 
investment capital. In other words, significant asset growth, investment growth, and external 
financing often come hands in hands. This is confirmed by a simple correlation test. Table 5 
presents the time-series averages of the cross-sectional Spearman rank correlations between 
these three variables. Since I intend to examine if increases in assets and investments are 
accompanied by external financing, I require asset and investment growth to be positive for the 
computation of correlations. The average correlation between asset growth and external 
financing is 0.70 and the average correlation between investment growth and external financing 
is 0.39. Not surprisingly, asset growth and investment growth are also highly correlated with a 
coefficient of 0.44. All correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level. The correlations 
are even higher if I limit to the observations with extremely large asset and investment growth.  
The evidence of stock return underperformance following large equity or debt financing is 
ubiquitous. Loughran and Ritter (1995), and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) find that firms 
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conducting seasoned equity offerings significantly underperform non-issuing firms for up to 
five years following the offerings. Ritter (2003) shows the underperformance during the first 
five years is about 20% relative to control firms matched on size and book-to-market equity. 
Daniel and Titman (2006) and Pontiff and Woodgate (2008) construct comprehensive measures 
of equity issuances that capture outstanding share variations due to SEOs, stock acquisitions, 
stock repurchases, and other corporate transactions, and find that they are negatively related to 
future returns in the cross-section. Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999) find significant return 
underperformance for firms have conducted public bond offerings. The average magnitude is 
over 20% in five years. Lee and Loughran (1998), and Dichev and Piotroski (1999) find that 
firms with large issues of convertible debt underperform the market on the magnitude of 50 to 
70 percent in the following five years. Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (2006) find significant 
long-run return underperformance following bank loans despite of the widely-documented 
positive announcement returns. Combining with the positive return performance following 
open market repurchases, documented by Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995), 
Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2006) develop a comprehensive measure of net external 
financing and find a negative relation between this measure and future stock returns. They 
claim that the economic and statistical significance of their results is stronger than in previous 
studies focusing on individual categories of financing.  
I examine two research questions in this section: (1) To what extent are the large increases in 
assets or investments of firms in deciles 8 to 10 driven by large external financing? (2) Do the 
poor returns of these firms in the following year merely reflect the widely-documented return 
underperformance following large equity or debt issuances? Results pertaining to the first 
question are presented in Table 6, in which Panel A is for the asset growth anomaly and Panel B 
 18 
is for the investment growth anomaly. The variables in the first three rows are, respectively, the 
proceeds of new equity issues, net debt issues, and the sum of equity and debt issues deflated 
by the issuing firm’s lagged total assets. The fourth and fifth rows present the annual 
percentage changes in shares outstanding, and in the debt amount. The construction of 
percentage change in shares outstanding adjusts for distribution events such as stock splits and 
stock dividends, as in Pontiff and Woodgate (2008). Data used for computation are obtained 
from the fundamental annual file in the merged CRSP and Compustat database. The reported 
numbers are the time-series means of the cross-sectional medians in each AG or IG decile.  
I find that on average, firms in the first eight asset growth deciles issue equity that amounts 
to less than 1% of the firm’s existing assets. This is in sharp contrast to the firms in the highest 
asset growth decile (decile 10), which issue equity amounting to 70.48% of their existing assets. 
This evidence confirms that equity offerings are rare, but once they occur, they are large in 
magnitude. Firms in the first four deciles reduce debt, and the reduction for firms in decile 1 is 
about 3% of the firms’ existing assets. In contrast, firms in decile 10 on average increase debt by 
16.77% of their assets. Combining equity and debt issues, I find that firms in decile 1 reduce 
assets by -2.11% while firms in decile 10 double their assets through external financing. The 
percentage changes suggest consistent results – the substantial increases in assets for the firms 
in the last several deciles are primarily fuelled by external financing.  
I also examine the percentage of firms whose equity or debt issues relative to its existing 
assets are greater than the 90th percentile of all firms in the year.  That is, their debt or equity 
issuances place them among the top 10% largest issuers in that year.6 As shown in Panel A of 
Table 3, less than 5% of the firms in the first six deciles (5.41% for firms in decile 1) have 
                                                 
6 The choice of 90 percentile, admittedly, is arbitrary. My following results are qualitatively similar, 
however, using alternative cutting points such as 80 percentile or third quartile.  
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financed externally to such a large amount. However, the percentage of firms with such a high 
level of external financing is 17.54% for decile 8, 46.76% for decile 9, and a surprisingly high 
86.98% for decile 10. Since previous studies have found significant return underperformance 
following large debt and equity issuances, it is important to investigate if the poor returns of 
firms in high asset growth deciles are driven by this subsample.  
To do so, I divide firms in deciles 8, 9, and 10 into two groups (Group II and III), depending 
on whether the firm has issued a large amount of debt or equity in the year of asset growth 
(over the 90th percentile). Firms in the first seven deciles are regarded as a benchmark group 
(Group I), in which firms have relatively low asset growth and used little external financing. 
Group II consists of firms that have achieved significant asset growth, but not by using a large 
amount of external financing. Group III consists of firms that have grown their assets 
substantially through large external financing. I examine the differences in portfolio returns 
between these groups. The delisting bias is adjusted as before and the results are presented in 
Panel A of Table 7. Not surprisingly, Group I consists of 70% of the firm-month observations. 
Groups II and III each accounts for approximately half of the remaining observations. I find that 
both the equal- and value-weighted returns are similar between Groups I and II, although their 
asset growth rates differ significantly. However, the portfolio returns between Groups II and III 
differ significantly despite of the similar rates of asset growth for firms in these two groups. 
Time-series regressions of the Fama-French three-factor model yield consistent results, 
suggesting that the key factor is whether firms have used large external financing. Firms that 
grow assets through large external financing incur significantly negative returns in the 
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following year, while firms that grow assets through other channels (e.g., retained earnings, 
external financing of small or medium size) do not underperform.7 
A recent study by Fama and French (2008) also suggests the importance of equity issues in 
affecting the asset growth anomaly. They divide firms’ total assets by the number of shares 
outstanding and measure asset growth on a per share basis, by which they control for the 
growth of assets due to new equity issues, stock-swap acquisitions, and stock repurchases (for 
negative growth). Although Fama and French do not find robust asset growth effects in large 
stocks – stocks with market capitalization above the NYSE median, they still find significant 
asset growth effects in microcaps and small stocks. This is because they do not control for the 
asset growth driven by debt issuances as well as the delisting bias. Spiess and Affleck-Graves 
(1999) demonstrate more severe return underperformance for small firms following debt 
issuances. Adjusting for the delisting bias, I find that Fama and French’s finding of robust asset 
growth anomaly in relatively small firms is driven primarily by the firms that grow their assets 
through debt increases. In the last row of Panel A of Table 6, I show that debt issuances are as 
important as equity offerings in driving extreme large asset growth.   
In their Section II.D, CGS examine the interaction between the asset growth anomaly and 
the share issuance/repurchase anomaly. They run Fama-MacBeth regressions of annual stock 
returns on asset growth and share issuance variables, and find that the coefficient estimates of 
the asset growth variable show up significance more often than the share issuance variables. 
Moreover, they find that the asset growth effect is more pronounced among small and medium 
                                                 
7 Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) find that underperformance following equity issues is concentrated 
primarily in small issuing firms with low book-to-market equity ratio. Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999) 
find more severe underperformance for smaller firms following public debt offerings. These external 
financing issuers are thus more likely to have a high proceeds-to-assets ratio, qualifying them into decile 
9 or 10. 
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size firms, whereas the share issuance effect is stronger among large firms.8 Similar to Fama and 
French, they do not control for the effect of debt issuances on asset growth, which results in 
their finding of a stronger asset growth effect in small and medium firms after controlling for 
share issuances.  
Although never interpreted in this way, some of the CGS results imply the lack of an 
independent asset growth effect after controlling for equity and debt issuances. In their Section 
II.C, CGS decompose total asset growth into four components: stock financing growth, debt 
financing growth, retained earnings growth, and the leftover (which they call operating 
liabilities growth). They run Fama-MacBeth regressions of annual stock returns on the lagged 
components of asset growth in all firms as well as firms in different size groups, and find that 
growth in debt predicts significantly negative returns in the following year for small and 
medium size firms but not for large firms whereas growth in equity predicts negative returns 
for small and large firms but not for medium firms. However, neither the growth in retained 
earnings growth nor the growth in operating liabilities predicts returns in the subsequent year, 
after controlling for debt and equity growth, in the regressions of all firms and firms in three 
different size groups. This is consistent with my findings for Group II stocks in Table 7 – asset 
growth not relying on external financing does not predict lower future returns. 
As a check for robustness, I also decompose the asset growth rate into three components: the 
growth due to equity issuances, the growth due to debt issuances, and the growth due to others 
(including the growth in retained earnings and the growth in operating liabilities in CGS’s 
study), and similar to CGS, run Fama-MacBeth regressions of individual stock returns on these 
                                                 
8 The asset growth variables in CGS’s regression results of Table V still contain the growth of assets by 
equity offerings. According to my findings in Tables 5 and 6, the correlation between these variables is 
presumably very high.  
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components. Before the adjustment of the delisting bias, each of these components negatively 
relates to the subsequent year returns in univariate regressions, and the relations are statistically 
significant. However, the variable of asset growth due to others does not predict returns after 
controlling for the asset growth due to equity and debt issuances. Moreover, if the delisting bias 
is corrected, the asset growth due to others fails to predict returns even in univariate 
regressions. The overall results (available upon request) are consistent with what I have shown 
in Table 7. Asset growth does not have an independent effect on stock returns after controlling 
for the delisting bias and the return underperformance following large external financing. 
Although lesser in magnitude, external financing does have a similar impact on the 
investment growth anomaly. As reported in Panel B of Table 6, firms in the highest investment 
growth decile (decile 10) tend to use a significantly higher amount of external financing than 
firms in other deciles. They also have a higher percentage of firms that have issued a large 
amount of debt or equity (i.e., over the 90th percentile during the recent two years). To account 
for the possible lag of capital expenditure following external financing, external financing is 
accumulated for two years instead of only the year of investment growth. Panel B of Table 7 
compares returns between the portfolio of stocks that do not increase investments much (Group 
I), the portfolio of stocks that increase investments substantially but do not resort to large 
external financing (Group II), and the portfolio of stocks that increase investments substantially 
and in the meantime, issue a large amount of debt or equity (Group III). Similarly, I find the 
poor return performance is limited to stocks in Group III. Firms in Group II, though they have 
expanded investments significantly, do not realize negative returns in the subsequent year.  
 
4. Conclusion 
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 Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) find a significant asset growth effect in the cross-section of 
stock returns. Stocks in the low asset growth deciles outperform stocks in the high asset growth 
deciles in the following year. Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) and a few other studies find an 
investment growth effect on stock returns. Firms that substantially increase capital expenditure 
realize abnormally low returns in the subsequent year. I find that the superior returns of the low 
asset and investment growth deciles result from the delisting bias in CRSP data and that the 
poor returns of the high asset and investment growth deciles are primarily driven by a 
subsample of firms that have issued large amounts of debt or equity in the previous year. After 
controlling for these two factors, I do not find an independent asset or investment growth effect 
on stock returns.  
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Table 1  
Portfolio returns sorted on asset and investment growth 
 
At the end of June of each year t from 1968 to 2008, stocks are allocated into deciles based on their asset or investment growth rates at fiscal year t-
1. Asset and investment growth are defined as in Eq. (1) and (2) of the paper. The portfolios are held for 1 year, from July of year t to June of year 
t+1, and then rebalanced. This table reports the time-series averages of yearly cross-sectional median asset and investment growth rates, equal-
weighted and value-weighted portfolio returns, and alphas – the intercepts of the time-series regressions of portfolio returns on the Fama-French 
three factors. Alphas marked with * are statistically significant at the 5% level. All numbers are in percentage. Corporate data (total assets, capital 
expenditure, and sales) are obtained from the CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged database’s fundamental annual file. Stock return data are obtained 
from CRSP’s monthly stock return file. The sample period of stock returns is from July 1968 to December 2009. 
 
Panel A: Portfolios sorted on asset growth 
 
 
  
Asset growth deciles formed 
in June of year t  1(Low)  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10(High) 
Spread(1‐10)
(t‐stat) 
Spread(1‐6)
(t‐stat) 
Asset growth rates from 
fiscal year t‐2 to t‐1  ‐21.12  ‐6.75  ‐0.75  3.31  6.98  11.04  16.32  25.05  44.38  129.82 
‐150.94
(‐36.79) 
‐37.44
(‐90.36) 
EW portfolio monthly 
returns (July t ‐ June t+1)  1.79  1.62  1.53  1.36  1.26  1.22  1.15  0.95  0.78  0.17 
1.62
(9.03) 
0.58
(2.72) 
VW portfolio monthly 
returns (July t ‐ June t+1)  1.26  1.10  1.15  1.01  0.94  0.88  0.92  0.85  0.74  0.27 
0.99
(4.63) 
0.38
(2.01) 
FF alpha for EW portfolio 
returns  0.59*  0.45*  0.36*  0.25*  0.19*  0.16*  0.10  ‐0.10  ‐0.24*  ‐0.82* 
1.41
(8.87) 
0.43
(2.48) 
FF alpha for VW portfolio 
returns  0.15  0.11  0.15*  0.14*  0.04  0.08  0.15*  0.12  0.02  ‐0.49* 
0.64
(3.64) 
0.07
(0.49) 
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Panel B: Portfolios sorted on investment growth 
 
Investment growth deciles 
formed in June of year t  1(Low)  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10(High) 
Spread(1‐10)
(t‐stat) 
Spread(1‐6)
(t‐stat) 
Investment growth rates at  
fiscal year t‐1  ‐80.30  ‐57.17  ‐40.65  ‐27.08  ‐14.62  ‐2.31  12.06  31.96  68.41  193.98 
‐274.28
(‐136.51) 
‐77.99
(243.26) 
EW portfolio monthly 
returns (July t ‐ June t+1)  1.35  1.33  1.31  1.25  1.22  1.22  1.15  1.14  1.15  0.78 
0.57
(6.12) 
0.13
(0.81) 
VW portfolio monthly 
returns (July t ‐ June t+1)  0.62  1.00  1.04  1.02  0.89  0.85  0.85  0.85  0.90  0.45 
0.17
(1.16) 
‐0.22
(‐1.05) 
FF alpha for EW portfolio 
returns  0.24  0.21  0.20*  0.15  0.14  0.13  0.09  0.05  0.06  ‐0.28* 
0.52
(5.75) 
0.11
(0.79) 
FF alpha for VW portfolio 
returns  ‐0.26*  0.16  0.26*  0.23*  0.10  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.03  ‐0.42* 
0.16
(1.05) 
‐0.28
(‐2.01) 
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Table 2  
The missing of delisting returns in CRSP monthly stock return file 
 
This table presents the delisting-month return missing information of non-financial firms in the CRSP monthly stock return file during July 1968 to 
December 2009. I first identify the month when a stock is delisted, if so, and the month that the stock’s last monthly return is reported in the CRSP 
monthly stock return file, and compute the time difference between the month of delisting and the month of last reported return. The month of 
delisting is obtained from the CRSP monthly stock event file. 
 
Delisting information 
 
Number of stocks 
(%)
Delisted for performance reasons 
(%)
Month (Delisted) = Month (last reported 
return) 
1,490 
(9.38%) 
490 
(32.89%) 
Month (Delisted) = Month (last reported 
return) +1 
14,313 
(90.13%) 
6,970 
(48.70%) 
Month (Delisted) > Month (last reported 
return) +1 
78 
(0.49%) 
60 
(76.92%) 
Total number of delisted stocks  
 
15,881 
(100%) 
7,520 
(47.35%) 
The number of stocks that are still listed 
by the end of December 2009 
4,004   
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Table 3 
Delisting and its effect on portfolio returns 
 
This table presents the probability of delisting for stocks in each asset or investment growth decile. The differences in probability between decile 1 
and 10 are tested using a two-proportion z-test. Missing delisting returns for stocks delisted for performance-related reasons (delisting code 500, 
505-588) are replaced by a figure of -30% to adjust for the delisting bias. The table reports the equal and value-weighted portfolio returns and the 
alphas from the Fama-French three-factor model for each asset or investment growth portfolio, as well as the spreads and the associated t-statistics 
between deciles 1 and 10. Alpha estimates marked with * are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
Panel A: Portfolios sorted on asset growth 
 
Asset growth deciles formed 
in June of year t  1(Low)  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10(High) 
Spread(1‐10)
(z/t‐stat) 
Spread(1‐6)
(t‐stat) 
 
Probability of delisting  17.75  11.38  9.47  8.34  8.22  7.56  7.91  7.63  8.20  9.22 
8.53
(23.11) 
Probability of delisting for 
poor performance  12.48  5.64  3.26  2.49  2.17  2.08  2.22  2.56  3.31  4.55 
7.93
(26.65) 
EW portfolio monthly 
returns (July t ‐ June t+1)  1.50  1.50  1.47  1.31  1.22  1.17  1.10  0.90  0.72  0.10 
1.40
(8.01) 
0.33
(1.56) 
VW portfolio monthly 
returns (July t ‐ June t+1)  1.18  0.97  1.10  0.85  0.84  0.85  0.86  0.77  0.71  0.23 
0.97
(4.48) 
0.32
(1.65) 
FF alpha for EW portfolio 
returns  0.31  0.33*  0.30*  0.19*  0.14  0.12  0.06  ‐0.14  ‐0.30*  ‐0.91* 
1.22
(7.76) 
0.19
(1.16) 
FF alpha for VW portfolio 
returns  0.05  ‐0.03  0.10  ‐0.04  ‐0.07  0.05  0.10  0.06  ‐0.01  ‐0.52* 
0.58
(3.16) 
0.00
(0.01) 
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Panel B: Portfolios sorted on investment growth 
 
Investment growth deciles 
formed in June of year t  1(Low)  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10(High) 
Spread(1‐10)
(z/t‐stat) 
Spread (1‐6) 
(t‐stat) 
 
Probability of delisting  13.67  10.68  9.73  8.65  8.39  8.09  8.20  8.28  8.83  10.21 
3.46
(17.66) 
Probability of delisting for 
poor performance  8.78  5.12  3.85  3.52  2.70  2.43  2.51  2.59  3.21  4.48 
4.30
(24.26) 
EW portfolio monthly 
returns (July t ‐ June t+1)  1.23  1.27  1.27  1.21  1.19  1.19  1.12  1.11  1.11  0.71 
0.52
(5.58) 
0.04
(0.24) 
VW portfolio monthly 
returns (July t ‐ June t+1)  0.63  1.01  1.04  1.03  0.89  0.85  0.85  0.85  0.91  0.45 
0.18
(1.26) 
‐0.22
(‐1.03) 
FF alpha for EW portfolio 
returns  0.11  0.15  0.15  0.11  0.11  0.10  0.06  0.02  0.01  ‐0.35* 
0.47
(5.13) 
0.01
(0.10) 
FF alpha for VW portfolio 
returns  ‐0.26*  0.18  0.26*  0.24*  0.10  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.04  ‐0.41* 
0.16
(1.06) 
‐0.28
(‐1.97) 
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Table 4 
Delisting returns in CRSP monthly stock event file 
 
The table presents the information about delisting returns in CRSP’s monthly stock event file for delisting during the period of July 1968 to 
December 2009. Delisting stocks with the codes 500, 505 to 588 are considered as triggered by performance-related reasons. Delisting returns are 
considered as not retrieved if the delisting return is missing or replaced by a partial-month return. The information is classified separately for 
NYSE/AMEX and Nasdaq stocks.  
 
Delisting 
returns 
retrieved? 
Delisting 
Reasons 
NYSE/AMEX  Nasdaq 
N 
(%) 
Mean 
(median) 
delisting 
returns (%)
N 
(%) 
Mean 
(median) 
delisting 
returns (%)
Yes  Performance‐
related 
1199 
(23.75%) 
‐44.52 
(‐48.29) 
4981 
(45.82%) 
‐21.02 
(‐14.29) 
Others  3581 
(70.92%) 
2.74 
(1.33) 
4707 
(43.30%) 
3.34 
(1.41) 
 
No  Performance‐
related 
231 
(4.58%) 
  1129 
(10.39%) 
 
Others  38 
(0.75%) 
  54 
(0.50%) 
 
Total    5049 
(100%) 
  10871 
(100%) 
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Table 5  
Spearman rank correlations between asset growth, investment growth, and external financing 
 
This table presents the time-series averages of the cross-sectional Spearman rank correlations between asset growth, investment growth, and net 
external financing. Variables are defined as follows: 
 
Asset growth  ൌ ୘୭୲ୟ୪ ୅ୱୱୣ୲ୱ౪ି୘୭୲ୟ୪ ୅ୱୱୣ୲ୱ౪షభ୘୭୲ୟ୪ ୅ୱୱୣ୲ୱ౪షభ , 
 
Investment growth  ൌ େ୅୔୉ଡ଼౪ି୑ୣୟ୬ሺେ୅୔୉ଡ଼౪షభ, େ୅୔୉ଡ଼౪షమ,େ୅୔୉ଡ଼౪షయሻ୘୭୲ୟ୪ ୅ୱୱୣ୲ୱ౪షభ , 
 
Net External Financing  ൌ ሺୗୟ୪ୣୱ ୭୤ େ୭୫୫୭୬ ୟ୬ୢ ୔୰ୣ୤ୣ୰୰ୣୢ ୗ୲୭ୡ୩౪ି୔୳୰ୡ୦ୟୱୣୱ ୭୤ େ୭୫୫୭୬ ୟ୬ୢ ୔୰ୣ୤ୣ୰୰ୣୢ ୗ୲୭ୡ୩౪ሻାሺ୘୭୲ୟ୪ ୈୣୠ୲౪ି୘୭୲ୟ୪ ୈୣୠ୲౪షభሻ୘୭୲ୟ୪ ୅ୱୱୣ୲ୱ౪షభ , 
 
where total debt is the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities. I limit the sample period to be 1971-2008 because statements of cash 
flow data are widely available in Compustat only since fiscal year 1971. Since I intend to examine if increases in assets and investments are 
accompanied by large external financing, I require asset growth and investment growth to be positive for the results of this table. The associated t-
statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
 
 
Asset Growth  Investment Growth  Net External Financing 
Asset Growth    0.44 
(38.33) 
0.70 
(63.79) 
Investment Growth      0.39 
(30.95) 
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Table 6  
External financing in asset and investment growth portfolios 
 
This table presents the time-series average equity issues, net debt issues, and external financing (i.e., the sum of equity and net debt issues) relative 
to the issuing firms’ total assets in the previous fiscal year. It also presents the percentage change in shares outstanding and in debt amount for 
each asset or investment growth decile. Changes in shares outstanding due to firm distribution events are adjusted away. For Panel B pertaining 
to the investment growth anomaly, external financings are accumulated for both year t-1 and year t-2 deflated by the total assets at t-3. The 
purpose is to account for the possible lag of capital investments following external financing. Corporate data are obtained from the 
CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged database’s fundamental annual file. The variable of sale of common and preferred stock is SSTK (previously data108 
in the Compustat industrial annual file). Net debt issues are calculated as the annual change in the sum of long-term and short-term debt (DLTT + 
DLC, previously data9 + data34). The last rows report the percentage of firms in each decile that have issued equity or debt, equity and debt, and 
debt separately, relative to their existing total assets above the 90th percentile across all firms in each year.  
 
Panel A: Portfolios sorted on asset growth 
 
 
Asset growth deciles formed in 
June of year t based on AG(t‐1)  1(Low)  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10(High) 
Spread 
(1‐10) 
Sale of new stock at t‐1 
(deflated by total assets)  0.18  0.11  0.11  0.14  0.22  0.30  0.47  0.91  6.30  70.48  ‐70.30 
Net debt issues at t‐1 
(deflated by total assets)  ‐2.89  ‐1.65  ‐0.85  ‐0.15  0.53  1.32  2.86  5.24  9.77  16.77  ‐19.66 
External Financing at t‐1 
(deflated by total assets)  ‐1.93  ‐1.05  ‐0.45  0.23  1.16  2.53  5.03  10.25  25.67  103.52  ‐105.45 
Percentage change in shares 
outstanding at t‐1  0.43  0.21  0.19  0.27  0.45  0.69  1.38  3.34  10.29  37.54  ‐37.11 
Percentage change in debt 
amount at t‐1  ‐21.07  ‐10.87  ‐5.81  ‐1.67  1.99  6.96  14.42  26.72  46.82  77.67  ‐98.74 
Percentage of firms with stock or 
debt growth >p90  5.41  3.54  3.00  2.96  3.80  4.71  7.87  17.54  46.76  86.98  ‐81.57 
Percentage of firms with external 
financing >p90  1.62  0.91  0.70  0.62  0.73  0.83  1.52  3.56  15.31  75.78  ‐74.16 
Percentage of firms with debt 
growth >p90  1.64  1.32  0.96  1.06  1.22  1.60  3.66  10.91  30.70  47.01  ‐45.37 
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Panel B: Portfolios sorted on investment growth 
 
Investment growth deciles 
formed based on IG(t‐1)  1(Low)  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10(High) 
Spread 
(1‐10) 
Sale of new stock at t‐1 and t‐2 
(deflated by total assets)  3.91  1.17  1.11  1.09  1.04  1.06  1.12  1.46  2.08  7.97  ‐4.06 
Net debt issues at t‐1 and t‐2 
(deflated by total assets)  0.34  0.96  1.48  2.07  2.13  2.58  3.22  3.45  3.71  6.20  ‐5.86 
External Financing at t‐1 and t‐2 
(deflated by total assets)  10.91  5.06  5.40  5.96  5.57  6.15  7.16  8.57  11.16  25.19  ‐14.28 
Percentage change in shares 
outstanding from t‐3 to t‐1  6.41  3.36  3.34  3.82  4.12  4.18  5.54  7.45  9.28  15.12  ‐8.71 
Percentage change in debt 
amount from t‐3 to t‐1  ‐1.94  2.45  6.25  10.23  11.13  13.87  17.43  19.26  19.94  32.26  ‐34.20 
Percentage of firms with stock or 
debt growth >p90  22.96  16.11  14.90  13.72  12.76  12.88  14.13  16.56  20.10  32.21  ‐9.25 
Percentage of firms with external 
financing >p90  15.67  9.34  8.08  6.71  6.11  6.33  6.90  8.50  11.36  22.03  ‐6.36 
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Table 7  
Asset growth portfolio returns after controlling for the delisting bias and large external financing 
 
This table presents the equal- and value-weighted portfolio returns and the Fama-French three-factor model alphas of three groups of stocks. 
Stocks in Group I are stocks in the first seven asset or investment growth deciles (negative or low growth). Group III consists of stocks in the last 
three deciles (high growth) that have used large amounts of external financing (i.e. net debt or equity issues above the 90th percentile of all firms 
in that year). Group II is made up of the remaining stocks in the last three deciles, which have increased their assets or investments substantially 
but have not used large amounts of external financing. Alpha estimates marked with * are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
Panel A: Portfolios sorted on asset growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Asset growth deciles formed 
in June of year t 
Group I:  
Decile 1‐7 
Group II:
Decile 8‐10 
(excl. EF) 
Group III:
Decile 8‐10  
(EF) 
Spread(I‐II) 
(t‐stat) 
Spread (II‐III) 
(t‐stat) 
EW portfolio monthly returns 
(July t ‐ June t+1)  1.23  0.95  0.18 
0.28
(1.85) 
0.77
(8.63) 
VW portfolio monthly returns 
(July t ‐ June t+1)  0.95  0.86  0.37 
0.09
(0.71) 
0.49
(4.15) 
FF alpha for EW portfolio 
returns  0.16*  ‐0.06  ‐0.85* 
0.22
(2.16) 
0.78
(9.76) 
FF alpha for VW portfolio 
returns  0.09  0.16*  ‐0.42* 
‐0.07
(‐0.73) 
0.58
(5.14) 
Firm‐month observations 
(%) 
1,339,937
(70.05%) 
283,909
(14.84%) 
288,959
(15.11%)     
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Panel B: Portfolios sorted on investment growth 
 
Investment growth deciles 
formed in June of year t 
Group I:  
Decile 1‐7 
Group II:
Decile 8‐10 
(excl. EF) 
Group III:
Decile 8‐10  
(EF) 
Spread(I‐II) 
(t‐stat) 
Spread (II‐III) 
(t‐stat) 
EW portfolio monthly returns 
(July t ‐ June t+1)  1.21  1.20  0.33 
0.01
(0.23) 
0.87
(6.66) 
VW portfolio monthly returns 
(July t ‐ June t+1)  0.90  0.87  0.39 
0.03
(0.31) 
0.48
(3.15) 
FF alpha for EW portfolio 
returns  0.11  0.09  ‐0.71* 
0.02
(0.33) 
0.80
(7.80) 
FF alpha for VW portfolio 
returns  0.10*  0.01  ‐0.46* 
0.09
(1.16) 
0.47
(3.70) 
Firm‐month observations 
(%) 
1,245,073
(70.84%) 
395,653
(22.51%) 
116,762
(6.64%)     
 
